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This paper examines whether patterns in communication behavior over 
time can predict the outcome of crisis negotiations. A sample of 189 
interaction episodes was transcribed from 9 resolved negotiations and 
coded according to differences in the degree and type of behavior. Par-
tial order scalogram analysis (POSAC) was used to produce a 
graphical representation of the similarities and differences among 
episodes while simultaneously uncovering the role of each behavior in 
shaping the negotiation process. Results showed that episodes could be 
represented along a partially ordered scale of competitiveness, which 
was structured by the occurrence of two types of behavior: Distributive–
Expressive and Integrative–Instrumental. The likelihood of negotiation 
success reduced with movement up the competitive scale, and 
negotiations involving episodes that passed a threshold of extreme 
competition on the scale inevitably ended unsuccessfully regardless of 
future developments. As negotiations developed over time, behavior 
alternated bet ween periods of increasing cooperation and periods of 
increasing competition, with unsuccessful negotiations associated with a 
concluding trend of increasing competitive behavior. 
One of the most compelling difficulties for hostage incident commanders is to 
make a decision about the appropriateness of continuing negotiations relative to 
implementing a tactical solution. This decision relies on using current dialogue to 
predict whether further interaction will lead to agreement, and so exemplifies 
research that attempts to discriminate high-risk cases based on information about a 
set of behavioral predictors (Taylor, Bennell, & Snook, 2002). The problem of pre-
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dicting negotiation outcome has been tackled by various authors using a variety of 
criteria (Holmes, 1991), but little consensus seems to have been reached as to what 
may be the most fruitful way. For example, studies that relate differences in the 
frequency of behavior use to outcomes are often criticized for not paying sufficient 
attention to how the order of issue consideration over time affects progress. Simi-
larly, decision rules developed by practitioners often have a form and output that is 
easier to apply and respond to than parametric statistics and probability values, but 
predictions from these rules are rarely linked to measurable units of behavior, and 
so may lack accuracy and reliability. Since each approach highlights a distinct but 
important aspect of the prediction problem, a major goal for research is to bring 
together the different features in a way that allows their relative predictive value to 
be assessed.  
The current paper views the lack of previous attempts to integrate criteria of 
different perspectives as having both conceptual and methodological roots: that is, 
conceptual understanding appears to have suffered from researchers using pre-
ferred methods that restrict possible analyses, while at the same time researchers 
fail to select other methods because the various facets of the negotiation process 
have not been clearly conceptualized. Since conceptual requisites should drive any 
methodological choice, the current paper begins by outlining three features that are 
central to previous solutions to the problem of predicting outcome. The three ideas 
combine to posit a measure of negotiation dynamics that is structured by differ-
ences in the occurrence of actual behaviors and predicts the likelihood of negotia-
tion success based on positions and patterns of change along its length. The need to 
consider methodology is a consequence of this  conceptual framework, since 
simultaneously testing many aspects of the negotiation process requires a multidi-
mensional coding of dialogue that is not easily handled by traditional methods of 
analysis. The predictions of the framework will instead be shown to fit neatly into a 
partial order of competitiveness along which outcome may be discriminated 
according to both immediate and long-term patterns in the degree and type of dia-
logue. 
Conceptualizing the Problem of Predicting Negotiation Outcome 
A Scale of Competitive Behavior 
One important family of prognostic models comes from efforts to formalize 
personal experiences into a set of coherent, integrated principles or decision rules 
(Bormann, 1980). The emphasis of this conceptual approach is to provide a clear 
yet brief set of criteria that can be employed at any point of time to help structure a 
decision-maker’s judgment about the degree of “success” in the current interaction. 
Discrimination of outcome in these frameworks typically takes the form of an 
additive scale, with the occurrence of more criteria implying increasing levels of 
antagonism and an increased likelihood of negotiation failure. For example, Noe-
sier (1999) provides eleven indicators that relate to the dialogue and direct actions 
of perpetrators, where the absence of such features implies an increased risk to the 
hostages. A more dynamic actuarial system, described by Sarna (1997), involves 
tracking development over time by categorizing current communication issues as 
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“red” (signs of trouble to be avoided) or “green” (signs of progress to be pursued). 
The preponderance of red or green issues during interactions is proposed as an 
important indicator of progress and is considered a direct predictor of outcome. 
The attractive and often overlooked feature of the experienced-driven 
approach is that differences among interactions can be meaningfully understood as 
points along a partially ordered scale of increasing competition. Competition on 
such a scale is gauged by the extent to which negotiators attempt to maximize indi-
vidual gain through dialogue that either attacks the other party or promotes a per-
sonally beneficial position (Sarna, 1997). The scale is partially ordered because 
negotiators consider only the amount of competition and do not judge different 
kinds of issues as inherently more or less competitive than other issues. Interac-
tions placed at the same position on the scale, while considered to involve the same 
degree of competitiveness, may be comprised of different types of competitiveness. 
Since these qualitative variations are not differentiated, the scale gives only a par-
tial ordering of the interactions. 
As an interaction unfolds, so the probability of negotiation success may be 
measured and tracked as movement along the competitive scale. Particular atten-
tion is given to a pre-defined threshold on the scale that gives an optimal prediction 
of outcome. Dialogue falling above this point is believed to affect the relationship 
between parties in such a way that it causes future interaction to move towards 
inevitable failure. Although practitioners usually derive this threshold from experi-
ence, research on a range of high-risk problems has accumulated support for the 
idea of empirically deriving a “cut point” or “prognostic threshold” on a scale of 
increasing likelihood (Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000). For example, experi-
mental research has long recognized the importance of reference points (Blount, 
Thomas -Hunt, & Neale, 1996; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002), where transition 
across a point has been shown to significantly predict future bargaining and nego-
tiation outcome. Similarly, studies developing scale -based questionnaires have 
identified a number of communicative acts that are predictive of interpersonal con-
flicts such as future marital failure (Gottman & Notarius, 2000) or physical vio-
lence (Bilsky, Borg, & Wetzels, 1995). These acts arguably mark the point in con-
flict where negotiation fails and individuals resort to using physical actions (against 
self or another) to bring about a resolution (Synder & Diesing, 1977). In terms of 
hostage crises, Abbott (1986) highlighted this danger point as a suicide phase of 
interaction, where the level of negotiated interdependence between the parties 
determines whether interactions move the hostage taker towards either surrender-
ing or inflicting self-harm. Although Abbott’s argument is for a specific threshold, 
Rogan and Hammer (1995) have since shown that neutral message affect, as meas-
ured on a single intensity scale, provides a more general cut-point in the sense that 
deviation away from this midpoint is related to negotiation outcome. In this sense, 
increments along a competitive scale relate to increasingly conservative decision 
thresholds, which require more extreme levels of behavior to be present before the 
negotiation is considered irreconcilable.  
A partially ordered scale is a remarkably simple account of the negotiation 
process that has nevertheless attracted a great deal of attention and use. At least 
part of the scale’s attractiveness is the result of several conceptual properties that 
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come from using a single dimension to judge both the role of individual predictors 
and the likely outcome of negotiation. A common measure of possible interaction 
content avoids artificially vie wing a negotiation as either success or non-success 
related, since it is possible to estimate the severity of an interaction by what posi-
tion it holds on the scale relative to other interactions. A scale defined by degree of 
competition contributes by pro viding a way to conceptualize and assess the roles 
different communication behaviors play in moving a negotiation towards a resolu-
tion. For example, while some behaviors make unique contributions to the bar-
gaining process (and so make important predictors), others shape development in a 
similar way (i.e., are collinear) and so will add little more to the prediction of out-
come than is provided by one behavior alone. Other behaviors may only correlate 
with negotiation outcome, while still further kinds may serve to accentuate or 
attenuate the impact of a determining behavior (i.e., moderate) (e.g., a threat of 
action reinforcing the impact of a demand). By focusing on the different ways in 
which behaviors affect a negotiation’s placement on the competitive scale, research 
can take an informed approach to refining the content of the predictive model and 
so may systematically improve prediction. Given these conceptual advantages and 
the similarity among diverse accounts of outcome prediction, the current project 
explicitly tests the existence of an underlying competitive scale, where increments 
along the scale are associated with a higher probability of negotiation failure: 
Hypothesis 1: Interactions of unsuccessful negotiations will be predomi-
nantly associated with higher positions on a scale of increas-
ing competitiveness compared to interactions of successful 
negotiations. 
Any evidence for this prediction would support the often-imposed restriction 
that interactions may be differentiated along a scale of increasing competitiveness. 
However, even when well-defined, a scale by itself is insufficient for making a 
prediction because it relies on judgments of dialogue that are highly susceptible to 
bias, especially given the extreme cognitive demands associated with crises (e.g., 
reduced attention span, cognitive rigidity; Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 
1991). Thus, despite repeated claims for a correspondence between conceptual 
models and negotiation outcome, reliable discrimination can only be achieved if 
points on the competitive scale are associated with measurable communication 
behaviors whose relationships to outcome can be systematically investigated. 
Variation in the Frequency and Type of Behavioral Predictors 
Most systematic attempts to link actual communication behaviors to negotia-
tion success have compared aggregate data across a small number of variables 
(e.g., Neale & Bazerman, 1983, 1985; Olekalns, 1994, 1997; Weingart, Thompson, 
Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). In these studies, the mean frequency of behavior use 
is compared across successful and unsuccessful negotiations, and results are 
asserted in the form of overall tendencies. For example, one central distinction is 
between Integrative behavior, characterized by cooperation and normative problem 
solving, and Distributive behavior, associated with coercive and aggressive 
attempts to move away from substantive discussion (Donohue & Roberto, 1996; 
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Miron & Goldstein, 1979; Weingart et al., 1990). These behaviors are frequently 
posited as interdependent orientations that produce a continuum of increasing 
competition (Donohue & Roberto, 1996; Putnam, 1990), and empirical evidence 
supports this conceptualization (Donohue, Diez, & Hamilton, 1984; Taylor 2002). 
Research has shown that successful negotiations are associated with more frequent 
use of Integrative behaviors such as a willingness to make concessions, exchange 
information, and support the other’s emotional needs (Donohue & Roberto, 1996; 
Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Putnam & Wilson, 1989). In contrast, frequent use of 
Distributive behaviors such as argumentative expressions, personal attacks, and 
unrealistic demands, reflect a contentious attitude towards interaction that is more 
likely to result in negotiation failure (Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 1993; Putnam & 
Wilson, 1989).  
Research has also shown that negotiators use different kinds of Integrative or 
Distributive behavior to pursue a variety of different concerns or goals (Taylor, 
2002; Wilson & Putnam, 1990). For example, messages about Expressive issues 
such as trust and affiliation are equally as important to the progress of negotiation 
as communication about more Instrumental task-related issues (Donohue, Lyles, & 
Rogan, 1989; Natslandsmyr & Rognes, 1995; Putnam, 1994). Negotiators may 
pursue an Integrative approach to Instrumental goals by communicating agreement 
and suggesting win–win solutions, but they may also adopt a Distributive approach 
to Instrumental issues through rejecting offers, making demands and suggesting 
unreasonable alternatives. Similarly, at other times, negotiators may address 
Expressive issues by emphasizing behaviors that manipulate relational develop-
ment (e.g., criticism, humor) or show concern for the other party’s or personal 
identity (e.g., insult, empathy). Such qualitative differences in communication are 
likely to be particularly evident in hostage crises, since the majority of cases 
encountered by law enforcement occur as a result of hostage takers’ mental or 
emotional inability to cope with life stressors (Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt, 
1994).  
The implication of these studies is that degree and type of communication 
behavior affects how a negotiation unfolds and so both aspects must be incorpo-
rated into the observable units of the predictive framework. The continuum inter-
pretation of Integrative and Distributive behaviors fits nicely within the current 
approach by aligning with the cooperative and competitive ends of the hypothe-
sized scale. Successful negotiations (associated with low regions of the competitive 
scale) would be predicted to involve more frequent use of Integrative behaviors, 
while unsuccessful negotiations (associated with the upper portion of the scale) 
would be expected to be predominantly associated with the occurrence of Distribu-
tive behaviors. Different qualities of Integrative and Distributive behavior may 
moderate these predicted associations, but only to the point of affecting the degree 
of the relationship between behavioral occurrence and scale placement and not the 
actual direction of this relationship (Taylor, 2002). Following this line of argument: 
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Hypothesis 2a: Movement up the competitive scale will be associated with 
increasing frequency of Instrumental and Expressive types of 
Distributive behaviors.  
Hypothesis 2b: Movement down the competitive scale will be associated 
with increasing frequency of Instrumental and Expressive 
types of Integrative behaviors.  
However, while support for these predictions will indicate the role behavioral 
frequency plays in determining outcome, it does not speak to the changing impor-
tance of these behaviors over the longitudinal structure of negotiation (Holmes & 
Sykes, 1993). Consequently, the possibility remains that highly predictive behav-
iors may become less useful over time, or that trends of behavior across episodes, 
rather than absolute values within episodes, are a better criterion for predicting 
outcome.   
Changing Patterns of Behavior Over Time  
The affect of message order on the progress of a negotiation is the central 
focus of phase analyses (Holmes & Sykes, 1993), prescriptive models of negotia-
tion development (Donohue et al., 1991), and a wealth of research on persuasion 
(Erwin, 2001). One approach to examining temporal differences has continued to 
study the relationship between outcome and variance in behavior use, but done so 
over a small number of time stages. These designs, when analyzed “within-sub-
jects,” can give some indication of how changes in the aggregate use of behaviors 
over time relate to negotiation outcome. Studies have shown that the final stage of 
successful negotiations is typically associated with increased creativity and reduced 
levels of positional arguing, whereas poor outcomes result from ineffective rela -
tionship management in the first half of negotiations and excessive co mpetitive 
bargaining in the final stages (Jones, 1988; Putnam, Wilson, & Turner, 1990; 
Simons, 1993). More recent studies have associated outcome with the degree 
negotiators reciprocate the other party’s use of Integrative or Distributive behavior, 
with sequences of Distributive behavior typically moving interactions toward less 
successful outcomes (Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & 
Genovese, 1999). Such findings are consistent with stage models of negotiation 
(Putnam, 1990), which view both Integrative and Distributive tactics as surfacing 
in dialogue during all stages of a negotiation, but associate unsuccessful negotia-
tions with a final stage of high Distributive behavior. 
The results of within-subjects studies have led researchers to associate the 
prediction of outcome with broad trends in communication that culminate (and so 
can be best observed) in the final stages of interaction. However, pointing to the 
high levels of within-subject variance in such studies, several authors have argued 
that simply incorporating a time factor is not sufficient to capture the complex 
dynamics of the negotiation process (Holmes, 1991). Evidence supporting this 
claim is orientated towards mapping out phases or episodes of activity over time, 
where an episode is a discrete period of dialogue focused on a single issue. Studies 
using phase analysis have demonstrated that quite complex changes in the focus of 
interaction underpin the larger trends towards problem-solving identified in within-
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subject studies (Donohue & Roberto, 1993; Holmes & Sykes, 1993). Negotiators 
may rapidly switch between cooperation and competition to deal with multiple 
concerns, return to previous phases of interaction as additional information sur-
faces, or skip phases entirely to avoid impasse. The implication of such dynamics 
is a more fluid pattern of change over time as negotiators use periods of increasing 
(and decreasing) competition and cooperation to move through their various con-
cerns. Yet even in the phase perspective, it is  the extent to which negotiators coop-
erate during a final resolution stage of interaction that determines the eventual out-
come of a negotiation. The phase studies, therefore, concur with the findings of 
within-subject studies, suggesting that localized complex patterns of behavior give 
rise to larger-scale, global trends that may be equally important predictors of nego-
tiation outcome, particularly during the final stages of interaction. 
Given a sufficient number of time periods, previous research would lead to 
the expectation that negotiation dialogue will produce several gradual movements 
up and down the competitive scale (Donohue & Roberto, 1996; Putnam, 1990). 
However, if the underlying scale accurately discriminates outcomes based on the 
global patterns in behavior, then it follows that successful and unsuccessful out-
comes will be associated with final trends towards cooperative and competitive 
ends of the scale respectively. Thus, it is predicted: 
Hypothesis 3a : Unsuccessful negotiations will be characterized by episodes 
that show a final upward trend of movement along the com-
petitive scale. 
Hypothesis 3b : Successful negotiations will be characterized by episodes that 




The data were a convenience sample of chronological transcripts from nine 
actual hostage crises. The accounts were produced from audiotape recordings of 
negotiations collected from the archives of various U.S. police departments, and 
have been used effectively in previous research (e.g., Donohue & Roberto, 1996; 
Taylor, 2002). The final transcripts represented a diverse set of negotiations, from 
“criminal” incidents in which an individual negotiates to gain some material bene-
fit, to “psychological” or “domestic” incidents, where the hostage taker’s focus is 
on attracting sympathy for a personal need. This range of incidents was sufficiently 
diverse to embody what previous research has shown reflects police officers’ per-
ceptions regarding the distinguishing goals and orientations of hostage takers 
(Donohue & Roberto, 1993).  
Classification of Outcome. In order to test the hypotheses concerned with 
negotiation outcome, it was necessary to generate a criterion for classifying each 
negotiation as successful or unsuccessful. Although any such categorization 
remains impressionistic and open to criticism, the criterion for unsuccessful inci-
dents was that law enforcement officials were forced to employ some form of tacti-
cal intervention (see also Holmes, 1991). It is important to emphasize that this cri-
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terion focuses only on the effectiveness of negotiation as a strategy for concluding 
an incident, and not on whether the outcome itself was successful (i.e., tactical 
resolutions may also yield successful outcomes). This exclusion criterion, there-
fore, possesses some validity because it only assumes that law enforcement opera-
tions will seek a negotiated surrender prior to being forced to resort to any form of 
tactical intervention. This assumption is supported by previous research (Butler, 
Leitenberg, & Fuselier, 1993; Fuselier, 1988).  
Application of this criterion was based on a reading of the transcripts, but was 
verified by cross-referencing to accompanying incident summaries and reports in 
local and national newspapers. Five negotiations were classed as unsuccessful 
(Cases A through E) while the remaining four negotiations were classed as suc-
cessful (Cases F through I). Successful and unsuccessful negotiations differed in 
composition, with successful negotiations involving more episodes (M = 24.3) 
compared to unsuccessful negotiations (M = 18.4), but less thought units per epi-
sode (M = 96.9, SD = 37.2, Range 14– 208) in comparison to unsuccessful incidents 
(M = 109.4, SD = 56.3, Range = 14–233). Table 1 gives details of the scenario and 
outcome of each transcript, together with a decomposition of talk fre quencies. 
Table 1 
Summary of Nine Crisis Negotiations 
Case Outcome Scenario and Composition 
Case A 
Criminal 
Unsuccessful An armed male–female couple held a manager hostage 
after being caught attempting a bank robbery. The law 
enforcement officers successfully negotiate for release of 
the female bank manager but are unable to dissuade the 
hostage takers from committing suicide. The negotiation 
contained 3291 thought units: 1405 (42%) hostage taker, 




Unsuccessful An armed male seized an elderly couple hostage in their 
home after fleeing police arrest for shooting an officer 
during an attempted bank robbery. The hostage taker 
shows extreme agitation following a conversation with 
his mother, and the police were forced to use a tactical 
assault to conclude the incident. This case consisted of 
516 thought units: 233 (44%) hostage taker, 261 (50%) 
police negotiator, and 32 (6%) others including the hos-
tages and the hostage taker’s relatives. 
Case C 
Criminal 
Unsuccessful A male perpetrator demands a financial reward in 
exchange for the negotiator’s son. The police authorities 
are unaware of the hostage taker’s location and several 
arranged rendezvous fail to engender a successful reso-
lution to the situation. The incident contained 447 
thought units: 190 (43%) hostage taker, 225 (50%) offi-
cial negotiator, and 32 (7%) other individuals. 
 Table 1 (contd.) 
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Case D 
Criminal 
Unsuccessful An armed, emotionally unstable individual barricaded 
himself at home after shooting and critically injuring a 
family member. The interactions oscillate between the 
local senior negotiating officer and a second police offi-
cer, who is a friend of the hostage taker, but neither is 
able to convince him to surrender. The transcription con-
sisted of 5441 thought units: 2421 (44%) hostage taker, 
(49%) police officer, and 357 (7%) other individuals. 
Case E 
Political 
Unsuccessful An armed male–female couple hijacked a local bus to 
publicize a religious cult and commit suicide in accor-
dance with prophecy. Although the interactions pro-
gressed as negotiators promised television coverage in 
return for release of the hostages, subsequent interactions 
failed to dissuade the couple from committing suicide. 
The incident contained 336 thought units: 217 (64%) 




Successful A single armed individual negotiating with two law 
enforcement officers after taking a female bank clerk 
hostage to mitigate an unsuccessful robbery. The police 
negotiators initially acted to secure the release of the 
female hostage, but when this proved unfruitful they refo-
cused efforts on convincing the hostage taker to com-
pletely surrender. The incident contained 1102 thought 
units: 437 (40%) hostage taker, 652 (59%) police nego-
tiator, and 13 (1%) other individuals. 
Case G 
Domestic 
Successful A single male held his six-month old daughter hostage in 
an attempt to persuade the child’s mother to retry life as a 
family. The hostage taker releases the child to his mother 
and then shortly afterwards surrenders himself to police 
authorities. The negotiation contains 2261 thought units: 
911 (40%) hostage taker, 889 (39%) police negotiator, 
and 461 (21%) hostage taker’s mother and girlfriend. 
Case H 
Political 
Successful A plane hijacking in which an unarmed male held two 
pilots hostage in order to speak with his girlfriend and get 
adequate help for drug rehabilitation. As the negotiations 
progressed, the hostage taker released one of the pilots in 
exchange for a conversation with his girlfriend, following 
which he surrendered to law enforcement authorities. The 
incident lasted for 1500 thought units: 667 (45%) hostage 




Successful A prison incident in which inmates took hostage several 
guards to negotiate for improved living standards. The 
negotiation progresses slowly until a mutually trusted 
third-party formulated an agreement that persuaded the 
prisoners to return peacefully to their cells. The transcript 
reports 4508 thought units: 2142 (48%) hostage taker and 
2366 (52%) police negotiator. 
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Transcript Coding Procedure 
The nine transcripts were subjected to a coding procedure that consisted of 
three sequential stages: a rhetorical structure analysis, unitization, and content 
coding. 
Rhetorical Structure Analysis. A rhetorical structure analysis was used to 
divide the transcripts into episodes of dialogue so that analysis would capture some 
of the changing patterns of behavioral occurrences over time. Episodes were 
defined as non-overlapping segments of dialogue during which negotiators com-
municated about a single, clearly distinguishable issue, without significant devia-
tion (dialogue movement, Mann & Thompson, 1988) away from that issue. Each 
episode therefore consisted of a discrete constellation of communication behaviors 
that differed in their type and their degree of occurrence. By examining the behav-
ioral make-up of each constellation, it is possible to identify the behaviors that 
characterize the various episodes of interaction and track changes in these behav-
ioral emphases across the complete negotiation process. In the current interactions, 
dialogue movement often emerged at changes in the person or object of focus (e.g., 
“How’s the kid doing?”), or when the scope of interactions shifted between general 
discussion and specific issues (e.g., “Ok, let’s talk in detail about the car”). Simi-
larly, a large amount of episode movement occurred following a break in contact 
between the parties, especially if a different negotiator or a third party initiated the 
subsequent interaction. 
The rhetorical structure analysis identified 189 episodes across the 9 tran-
scripts (M = 24.0, SD = 12.7, Range = 8–41), with a mean frequency of 103.0 
thought units in each episode (SD = 47.8, Range = 14–233). Although variation in 
the number of units per episode may influence analysis by restricting the potential 
occurrences of behavior, it was considered important to include this factor because 
it reflects the natural variation in dialogue across the negotiations. Moreover, any 
attempt to equalize the content of each episode by using more precise divisions 
than nuclear spans would have reduced the number of behaviors occurring to an 
unacceptably low level. Indeed, parsing the negotiations into episodes is a useful 
alternative to the arbitrary time -based divisions used in previous research (e.g., 
Donohue & Roberto, 1996; Putnam et al., 1990), because it establishes boundaries 
at shifts in the substantive focus of an interaction. Episode partitions may also 
enhance the operational value of the analysis  since significant changes in the focus 
of dialogue are likely to represent the only periods during which law enforcement 
officers have sufficient time to evaluate progress and tactics. 
Reliability of the episode partitions was tested by an independent coder who 
was trained in rhetorical structure analysis through practice with unused materials. 
The coder applied rhetorical structure analysis to all nine transcripts and achieved a 
unitizing reliability of .07 (Guetzkow, 1950), indicating discordance in about 7% 
of the episodes. Of the episodes boundaries identified by the coder, 98% were 
matched in position to those in the original coding, suggesting that discordance was 
mainly due to disagreements about the number rather than the placement of 
boundaries. All disagreements were resolved through discussion and mutual 
agreement prior to partitioning into thought units. 
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Partitioning Into Thought Units. The 189 interaction segments were further 
divided into thought units (Gottman, 1979) to allow the coding of single communi-
cation behaviors. At a conceptual level, a thought unit depicts a complete idea that 
an individual wishes to express, while in actual speech the unit occurs as an inde-
pendent clause with a subject and an object (e.g., “Get your men away from 
there”). Coding at this level, therefore, comes closest to isolating single communi-
cation acts and so minimizes the possibility of analysis overlooking smaller, but 
psychologically meaningful components of negotiators’ dialogue. The unitizing 
reliability was assessed by having a second independent coder parse a subset of 
477 speaking turns into thought units. The coder agreed on the placement of 95% 
of the thought units, and achieved a unitizing reliability of .04 (Guetzkow, 1950), 
indicating that about 4% of the unitizing divisions were in error. All errors in unit-
izing were addressed before the transcripts were coded. 
Coding of Communication Behaviors. The coding scheme consisted of four 
main categories that were formed by joining two widely accepted classifications of 
communication behavior from previous negotiation research (see Table 2). The 
objective of this coding scheme was not to provide an exhaustive categorization of 
behavioral strategies, but to capture well-defined differences that are known to 
both researchers and practitioners. The first distinction, central to a wide range of 
classification schemes, was between Integrative (cooperative) and Distributive 
(competitive) behavior (Donohue & Roberto, 1996; Weingart et al., 1999). This 
division is a particularly useful starting point for the current study because previous 
evidence has shown that these orientations form the opposite ends of a continuum 
running from cooperation to competition. In order to capture the different kinds of 
issues that emerge during a crisis negotiation, a second distinction was made 
between Instrumental and Expressive behaviors. Substantive (Instrumental) and 
emotional (Expressive) issues reflect two dominant motivational goals whose 
varying patterns of occurrences are likely to significantly affect the development of 
a negotiation (Hammer & Rogan, 1997; Miron & Goldstein, 1979). Since negotia-
tors can potentially communicate about Instrumental and Expressive issues using 
both Integrative and Distributive approaches, these distinctions were combined to 
form four coding categories, namely, Distributive–Instrumental, Integrative–
Instrumental, Distributive– Expressive and Integrative–Expressive. A fifth Func-
tional category was also used during coding to capture those aspects of dialogue 
that contain no objective psychological information and act as the simple building 
blocks of interaction. The five behavioral categories together with examples are 
shown in Table 2. 
The coding scheme was applied by the author to each thought unit within the 
189 interaction episodes, as they occurred in the sequential flow of dialogue. In 
applying the scheme to the content of each thought unit, it was not necessary to 
apply categories exclusively (more than one category could be applied to each 
thought unit) since analysis intended to focus on relative differences in behavior. 
However, the restricted nature of the thought unit yielded a one-code to one-unit 
correspondence without exception. Reliability of the transcript coding was assessed 
by having two judges, experienced in content analysis but blind to the research 
hypotheses, independently code each thought unit in Case B. Agreement with the 
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author’s coding, measured using Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960), was .69 (Range 
.59 to .74) with 81% agreement for the first judge and .77 (Range .63 to .82) with 
86% for the second judge. Inter-judge coding achieved a reliability of .66 (Range 
.49 to .73) with 80% agreement. These Kappa values suggest a good level of cod-
ing reliability (Fleiss, 1981). 
Table 2 






“Bring me a couple packs of cigarettes”. 
“If she comes here, I’ll open fire”. 





“All right, I’ll attempt to get you the cigarettes”. 
“I guarantee that nobody will hurt you”. 




“You sound a little bit immature to me”. 
“I’m not going to have a pissing contest with you”. 
“I’ve gone through this all my life, I’ve lost and lost and lost, 




“Well, everybody has problems with girls”. 
“Nobody has to convince me if good or bad about Johnny”. 





In accordance with previous research (Donohue & Roberto, 1996; Olekalns & 
Smith, 2000), the fifth Functional category was excluded from subsequent analysis 
because the behaviors it represents only aid exchange of information between 
speakers. The role of such behaviors in shaping negotiation is not well understood 
and is most likely to be indirect. Consequently, their inclusion is likely to reduce 
the ability of analysis to identify the systematic relationships between communica-
tion behavior and outcome. For each episode of interaction, the remaining four 
behavioral variables were scored according to the number of times they occurred in 
the thought units of the episodes’ dialogue. Scoring categories were absent (1), 
occurring at least seven times but less than fourteen times (2), and occurring four-
teen or more times (3), with the scoring of variables Integrative–Expressive and 
Integrative–Instrumental reversed to produce a common range in which positive 
occurrences reflected a higher level of competitiveness. These scoring divisions 
were not arbitrary, but represent the rounding of one half a standard deviation 
above and below the grand mean of occurrences for all four variables. This ensured 
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that the distribution of scores over the variables was approximately equal, while 
still allowing variability in category scores among each behavioral variable. The 
scoring approach also had the affect of eliminating the coding disagreements found 
during the reliability check. Specifically, a re -analysis of agreement in the coding 
of Case B, compared as before across the judges and between each judge and the 
author, but this time calculated on the trichotomous scores at the level of episode, 
indicated that there were no differences in coding (All Cohen’s Kappa = 1.00). The 
entire coding procedure resulted in a data matrix that crossed communication 
behaviors (columns) with episodes of interaction (rows), such that each of the 189 
episodes had a score of 1, 2 or 3 on each of the four behavioral variables. 
Analysis of Communication Behavior 
One approach to data analysis that will simultaneously examine degree and 
type of interaction episodes with respect to some underlying competitive scale is 
partial order scalogram analysis (Shye, 1985). A partial order analysis begins with 
a number of criteria for differentiating an observed population, where each crite-
rion provides one struct of an observed profile of structs for each member of the 
population. In the current project, these criteria are the four coded behavioral vari-
ables, and each population member is an interaction episode. Each episode, there-
fore, has a profile composed of four structs, one struct for each behavioral variable, 
where each struct may have a value of 1, 2, or 3. The structs were arranged consis -
tently for each profile and represented the following variables: Distributive–
Instrumental (first digit), Integrative–Instrumental (second digit), Distributive–
Expressive (third digit), and Integrative–Expressive (fourth digit). In other words, 
an episode’s profile is simply a row of the data matrix which, in the current coding 
scheme, can range from 1111 through to 3333, with all combinations among these 
two extremes empirically possible. 
Partial order analysis compares each profile with every other profile on two 
axes. The first axis distinguishes degrees of competitiveness by comparing each 
profile on the sum of scores across the four structs. An episode with profile x is 
considered more competitive than an episode with profile y if at least one struct of 
x has a higher score than the corresponding struct of y, and no struct of x has a 
lower score than its counterpart in y (e.g., compare 1221 and 1321). If one struct of 
x is higher than the corre sponding struct of y, but another struct of x is lower than 
its counterpart in y, then the profiles cannot be compared because they involve 
different types of competitiveness. The second axis allows for instances when epi-
sodes (profiles) have such non-comparable differences. Profiles that are non-com-
parable exist if and only if profile x scores higher than profile y  on one struct yet 
lower than profile y  on a different struct. For example, an episode involving high 
levels of Expressive behavior (e.g., 1122) will have a different combination of 
scores than one dominated by Instrumental behaviors (e.g., 2211), but both may 
have an identical sum of scores across all four structs (e.g., total sum of structs is 6 
in both cases). In conceptual terms, then, two episodes (profiles) are considered 
comparable when one involves an overall more frequent use of competitive 
behavior than the other. A pair of episodes are considered non-comparable if they 
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involve the same frequency of competitive behavior but differ in the extent this 
behavior addresses Expressive and Instrumental concerns. 
As a further illustration of the distinction between comparable and non-com-
parable profiles, Figure 1 shows a partial order of profiles representing the final 
episode of each negotiation. The scaling of final episodes represents one simple 
test of the hypothesized disparity between successful and unsuccessful incidents, 
since behaviors evident in this stage depict the climax of progression across the 
interactions (Putnam, 1990). Figure 1 represents all the profiles as distinct points in 
a two-dimensional space, where two profiles are connected by a line if their degree 
of competitiveness is comparable in the sense of the above definitions. One artifact 
of this rule is that each episode is positioned according to the sum of scores across 
the four structs, with higher totals associated with higher rows in the partial order. 
The highly competitive interaction of Case D (i.e., highest score, 3232) occupies 
the uppermost position in the diagram, while the least competitive episodes of Case 
F and Case H (i.e., lowest scores, 1211 and 1112) appear at the lowest position. All 
other profiles hold intermediate positions in the space that are determined by their 
relative comparability to one another. Profiles that differ in the type but not degree 
of competitiveness (non-comparable) are represented as spread along the horizontal 
axis. For example, several profiles have an identical sum of scores but quite dis -
tinct structs across their profiles (e.g., Case B and Case I). As these profiles have 
equivalent totals but distinct patterns, they involve different kinds of dialogue, and 
so are positioned at opposing ends of the horizontal axis. In contrast, Case G 
(1312) is linked by a line (i.e., considered comparable) to Case E (1322) because 
its profile may be made equivalent to Case E’s profile by increasing the score on 
the third struct. Finally, notice that the rule determining comparability means that 
Case E (1322), while having a lower sum of scores across the four structs, is not 
considered comparable to Case C (2313), since to move from Case E to Case C it is 
necessary to decrease the score on the third struct. 
In conceptual terms, the partial order in Figure 1 provides a simplified picture 
of the complex similarities and differences among final interaction episodes. By 
moving up the lines connecting points it is possible to identify paths of increasingly 
competitive interactions. Several paths emerge because final episodes involved 
different types of competitiveness, as reflected by the spread along the horizontal 
axis. A larger distance between two episodes on the horizontal axis implies a 
greater difference in the type of competitiveness. Representing the final episodes in 
this way allows a clear exa mination of whether behavioral competitiveness can be 
used to predict outcome. This is addressed by the dotted line on Figure 1, which 
shows all but one successful negotiation as relatively lower in the partial order 
compared to the five unsuccessful negotiations. The exception to this clear dis -
crimination of outcome is the successful negotiation of Case I, which has a profile 
equal in its sum of scores to the unsuccessful Cases B and E but different in the 
type of behaviors involved. Indeed, the non-comparability of Case I’s profile is 
responsible for the crossing of the lines joining Case F to Case I and Case H to 
Case G, which suggests that this prison incident involved qualitatively different 
dynamics to those found in the criminal and domestic cases. This non-comparabil-
ity does not directly affect the intrinsic structure of the partial order, but it does 
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Figure 1 
A Two-Dimensional Partial Order Diagram Showing Profiles of 
Communication Behavior from the Final Episode of 9 Crisis Negotiations as a 
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substantiate examining timing as well as degree of occurrence of behavior to gain a 
clearer discrimination of outcome. 
In order to examine the development of behavior across all episodes of inter-
action, the data were subjected to a Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Co-
ordinates (POSAC; Shye, 1985). POSAC adopts the principles described above 
and represents the resulting variation among profiles as points in the geometric 
space shown in Figure 2.1 This space is equivalent to that constructed in Figure 1 
but is rotated though 45 degrees such that increasing competitiveness is associated 
with the diagonal running from bottom-left to top-right of the POSAC space. Epi-
sodes with identical  profiles are represented in the POSAC space by the same point 
as there is neither a quantitative nor a qualitative basis for discriminating between 
them. Profiles differing in the degree of competitiveness are ordered according to 
their sum of structs as points along the Joint axis from bottom-left (i.e., 1111) to 
top-right (i.e., 3333). Profiles that involve the same degree of competitiveness but 
differ in the type of behavior (non-comparable) are represented as points spread 
along the Lateral axis that spans from top-left to bottom-right. However, because 
non-comparable profiles can occupy one of several positions along the Lateral axis 
while still preserving an order of increasing competitiveness, POSAC arranges the 
configuration so that the more structs  two profiles have in common, the closer their 
representative points appear in the solution space. For example, the profiles 3311, 
2312, and 1133 would be distributed along the Lateral axis because they involve 
the same degree of competitiveness (i.e., sum of structs = 8) but different types of 
behavior (i.e., patterns of scores across the structs). In positioning these profiles, 
POSAC would put 3311 and 2312 in close proximity since they have a common 
score on the second and third struct, while 3311 and 1133 would be positioned at 
opposite ends of the Lateral axis because they have no structs in common. The 
episodes represented by profiles 3311 and 1133 are considered to be more dis -
similar in the type of occurring behavior than the profiles 3311 and 2312. 
In general, POSAC determines the placement of profiles along the Joint and 
Lateral axes through a regioning process in which profiles with the same score on a 
struct (behavioral variable) are positioned closer together in the solution space than 
profiles with different scores on that struct. Specifically, each struct of a profile is 
considered separately, and profiles with the same score on the struct being exam-
ined are positioned into a contiguous region of the solution space. Thus, for each 
struct, POSAC attempts to position profiles in such a way that drawing straight 
lines through the solution space can separate profiles scoring a 1, 2 or 3 on the 
relevant struct. POSAC continues to move profiles around the solution space and, 
consequently, re-shapes the regions that encompass profiles with identical struct 
scores until each profile falls into the four contiguous regions that are appropriate 
for its score on each of the four structs. The result of this regioning is a configura-
tion in which each profile’s placement is defined by the intersections of regions 
formed by each struct. 
                                                               
1POSAC achieves a graphical configuration of points by assigning each profile a pair of 
coordinates (ranging from 0 to 100) for the X and Y axes of the solution space 
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Figure 2 
The positioning of Joint and Lateral Axes in POSAC 
 
  












As the shape of the regions’ encompassing scores on one struct are dependent 
on the scores that occur on the remaining structs, the relationship between regions 
created by one struct and regions formed by another struct may be examined to 
understand the role of each behavior in shaping the variations among profiles. For 
example, some structs may generate regions whose boundaries form parallel divi-
sions across the solution space. Since movement across the regions formed by one 
of these structs is related to movement across the regions formed by the second 
struct, these structs (behaviors) play a similar role in differentiating the interactions 
(i.e., are collinear). Other behavioral variables may create regions that are perpen-
dicular to one another. In this case, movement across the regions of one struct may 
be achieved without moving across a region of the second struct, implying that 
these aspects of dialogue play very different roles in shaping the similarities and 
differences among episodes. POSAC enables the role of each behavior to be sys-
tematically assessed by providing a set of identical geometric plots, one for each 
struct, in which the profiles are labeled with their score (i.e., 1, 2, or 3) on the struct 
being examined. These item plots may be examined for contiguous regions of 
scores, a process that is facilitated by POSAC providing a set of partitioning load-
ing coefficients. These coefficients range between 0.00 and 1.00, with a score of 
1.00 indicating that all episodes with a particular struct score may be partitioned 
into a region of the solution space without exception. In general, a coefficient 
above .80 is regarded as indicating that scores on a particular struct vary systemati-
cally across the partial order and that, as a result, the configuration of regions for 
that struct is likely to be unique and meaningful (Shye, 1985). 
POSAC calculates six coefficients per item plot (behavioral variable) to give 
an impression as to the suitability of six major forms of partitioning. Examples of 
the different types of partitioning are given in Figure 3. Of the six types of parti-
tioning, two divide the solution space in alignment with the X and Y axes. Behav-
ioral variables operating in this way are particularly interesting because they give 
the axes that define the position of profiles (episodes) within the space their pri-
Joint axis – Degree of Behavior  
(sum of structs) 
 
Lateral axis – Type of Behavior  
(pattern across structs) 
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mary meaning. These behavioral variables are therefore the two basic types of 
competitiveness that shape the differences among interaction episodes. A further 
two types of division align themselves with the diagonal axes, either forming 
regions along the competitive scale (J) or along the qualitative axis (L). Behavioral 
variables dividing the space along the Joint axis relate exclusively to the degree of 
competitiveness in interactions, such that changes in the occurrence of this behav-
ior will be matched by correspond ing changes in the degree of competition. 
Behaviors aligned with the Lateral axis influence only the type of competitiveness 
involved and so influence only the concern or issue that is the focus of interaction. 
Finally, a struct may also adopt one of two secondary roles in partitioning the 
POSAC space, either accentuating (Q) or attenuating (P) the possibilities to dis -
criminate between points that are high on X or Y.  Behavioral variables that 
accentuate the space increase the amount of qualitative variation in episodes at 
higher points on the scale, while attenuating variables increase the homogeneity of 
interactions such that profiles high on X will also be high on Y.  The interpretation 
of POSAC output is illustrated further in the Results section, but for additional 
explanation and examples see Borg and Shye (1995), Dancer (1990), Porter and 
Alison (2001), and Shye (1985). 
Figure 3 
Illustrations of the Six Major Types of Regions Formed by 
















Benefits of POSAC.  Although the question of predicting outcome in the cur-
rent data may be addressed through a number of methodologies, POSAC’s treat-
ment of the data offers a complementary alternative that has some attractive fea-
tures. First, POSAC is one of the few techniques available that allows researchers 
to address the problem of discriminating outcome from behavior. The question 
POSAC asks is: Suppose an episode has a known behavioral content but the out-
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come is unknown, what outcome should the episode be assigned, with minimal 
expected error? This question is actually the reverse of that tackled by traditional 
techniques such as analysis of variance (ANOVA), which ask: Suppose the out-
come of an episode is known but the frequencies of occurrence of its constituent 
behaviors are unknown, what are the best predicted values of occurrence for these 
behaviors? Unfortunately, insights into the problem of prediction are not generally 
forthcoming from studies analyzing variance, since these works have typically 
relied on classical statistical measures (e.g., F, t, and ?) that give no indication of 
the efficacy of discriminating outcome. Perfect discrimination of outcome can hold 
no matter what the size of these statistics (e.g., F, t and ? can approach unity, see 
Guttman, 1988). 
A second difference is that POSAC looks for regularities in the data without 
making any simplifying mathematical assumptions (e.g., linearity), since it com-
pares observations through inherent variations in composition rather than indirectly 
using some extrinsic probability framework. By staying close to the original multi-
variate structure of the data, POSAC avoids omitting features of the data that may 
be of theoretical importance or may reduce the explanatory power of any predictive 
model. Moreover, by not making any extrinsic assumptions of the data (e.g., nor-
mality of distribution) POSAC can access the many types of real-world data that 
interest conflict scholars but remain elusive because they violate traditional 
assumptions. Finally, rather than treat variables directly as the object of study, 
POSAC offers a different scientific imagery that views observations as representa-
tives of a domain space shaped by constructs in different ways.  By focusing on 
regional differences within a content space, it  is possible to gain an understanding 
of the “quality” or type of interrelationships among predictors that is not possible 
from a set of significance probabilities. More generally, comparing the mutual ori-
entation of regions within the space can enable systematic comparisons of concepts 
or theories that are difficult to operationalize and test in quantitative terms. This 
imagery and the associated clarity brought by examining regions of the space have 
proven a fruitful basis for cumulative research in other areas of social science (e.g., 
Dancer, 1990). 
Results 
The 189 interaction episodes were represented by 60 distinct profiles (out of a 
possible 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 = 81). A two-dimensional solution represented these profiles 
with a coefficient of correct representation (CORREP) of .832, indicating that 
approximately 92% of profiles are placed in the correct regions of the configura-
tion. Figure 4 shows a projection of the derived configuration in which each profile 
is denoted by its structs, and profiles suffixe d by a letter are the final episode of the 
case with the corresponding letter in Table 1. An initial examination of the partially 
ordered structure revealed a substantial amount of quantitative and qualitative 
spread in negotiation behavior, as shown by the even spatial distribution of points 
across the configuration. For example, the final episode of interaction for Case D is 
located towards the top-right corner of the space as profile 3232, and concludes 
with a higher degree of competitive behavior relative to the other negotiations. In
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contrast, the final episodes of Case C and Case I involve approximately equal lev-
els of competitive behavior (as shown by the roughly equivalent positions they 
occupy in the Joint axis), but differ in the type of behavior that occurred (as indi-
cated by their positions at opposite ends of the Lateral axis). Since the Joint direc-
tion of the solution space represents the proposed competitive scale, the large dis -
tribution of episodes along the Joint axis suggests that degree of competitiveness 
provides a useful way of differentiating among interaction episodes. 
Figure 4 
A Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Co-Ordinates (POSAC) of 60 
Profiles Derived from the 189 Interaction Episodes of 9 Crisis Negotiations 
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Behavioral Structure of the Competitive Scale 
Prior to examining the relationship between outcome and the competitive 
scale, it is useful to explicate the role each behavior (struct) plays in partitioning 
the configuration so that analysis can determine their contribution to any discrimi-
nation of outcome. The role of each behavior in structuring the scale relates to 
Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b, which predict movement up the scale to be asso-
ciated with regions denoting higher occurrences of Distributive behaviors and 
lower occurrences of Integrative behaviors. Figures 5a through 5d show the indi-
vidual item diagrams in which each profile is labeled by its associated score on the 
behavioral variable under examination. The plots also show the regions that 
emerge from POSAC’s attempt to put identical profiles in congruent regions of the 
space, and were divided according to the highest partitioning loading coefficient. 
For the current behaviors, these coefficients suggest quite high levels of homoge-
neity for scores in each region (M = .91, Range .78–1.00), although partitioning for 
the item Distributive–Instrumental yields a substantially higher level of error 
across the three regions (i.e., .78). Although this higher level of heterogeneity lim-
its the usefulness of Distributive–Instrumental behavior as a component of the 
POSAC space, it was considered acceptable given the latitude for error created by 
the refined nature of coding and the complexities inherent in crisis negotiations 
(Donohue et al., 1991). 
As shown in Figure 5a, the struct measuring Distributive–Instrumental 
behavior partitioned the solution space along the Joint direction, with increasing 
severity towards the top-right corner of the plot. Since the Joint axis distinguishes 
the various degrees of the partial order, the use of Distributive–Instrumental 
behaviors relates to parallel divisions along the competitive scale. In contrast, the 
struct measuring Integrative–Instrumental behavior (Figure 5b) plays a polar role 
in dividing the POSAC space, inducing roughly parallel regions along the X-axis 
that concord with the prediction that movement up the scale is associated with less 
occurrence of the behavior. These regions are orthogonal to the regions formed by 
scores on the third Distributive–Expressive struct (Figure 5c), which partition the 
spatial configuration into regions aligned with the vertical Y-axis. This suggests 
that Integrative–Instrumental and Distributive– Expressive behaviors are conceptu-
ally distinct elements of negotiation, which combine to structure the distribution of 
episodes in the POSAC space. Finally, the struct measuring Integrative–Expressive 
behavior (Figure 5d) adopted a secondary role in structuring the solution space by 
forming inverted L-shaped divisions that were ordered in accordance with the 
common range. This accentuating partition produces a finer distinction of points 
that are high on the X and Y base coordinates, implying that Integrative–Expres-
sive behavior will only occur when interactions involve low levels of Distributive–
Expressive communication and high levels of Integrative–Instrumental behavior. 
In relation to Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b, then, the positioning of 
regions denoting higher occurrence of Distributive behaviors towards the top-right 
of the configuration (Figures 5a and 5c) supports the prediction that increasing 
competition emerges with more frequent use of Distributive behaviors. In contrast, 
for both Integrative behaviors (Figures 5b and 5d) the most salient feature of the 
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Figure 5a 
Partitioning of POSAC Output for 



















Note: J partitioning loading coefficient = .78 
Figure 5b 
Partitioning of POSAC Output for 
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Figure 5c 
Partitioning of POSAC Output for  



















Note: Y partitioning loading coefficient = .99 
 
Figure 5d 
Partitioning of POSAC Output for 
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structural partitioning is the reversed common order, with higher occurrences of 
behavior positioned towards the bottom-left of the solution space. The opposite 
direction of these occurrences supports the hypothesized conceptualization of Inte-
grative and Distributive behavior as the antipodal points of a single partially 
ordered scale. 
Discriminating Successful and Unsuccessful Negotiations 
If the competitive scale is useful for outcome prognosis, then the majority of 
episodes associated with unsuccessful negotiations should be situated towards the 
top-right of the configuration (i.e., higher on the scale) in comparison to episodes 
from successful negotiations (Hypothesis 1). To examine this prediction, Figure 6 
shows the same POSAC configuration in which each profiles is labeled according 
to the number of success and non-success related episodes it represents. A profile 
is underlined if the majority of these episodes are associated with unsuccessful 
incidents. An examination of the partially ordered structure indicated that the final 
episodes of unsuccessful incidents formed a region quite distinct from that occu-
pied by concluding episodes of successful incidents. These regions are divided by a 
solid line on Figure 6. The differentiation between the two groups is so distinct that 
the region that encapsulated the concluding episodes of unsuccessful incidents 
contained only 13 incorrect predictions (6.9% of total episodes), isolated episodes 
from negotiations that ended successfully. Thus, an episode involving behavior 
whose profile is located to the right of the discriminating level would be prognosed 
as almost certainly ending unsuccessfully, even when subsequent interactions fall 
below this critical threshold. 
Although the division could have appeared in any direction of the POSAC 
space, its approximately perpendicular relation to the Joint axis indicates that a 
threshold on the competitive scale provides an almost perfect function for the 
prognosis of outcome. A corollary of this finding is that the best discrimination is 
given by the linear sum of the X and Y coordinates, since these coordinates define 
where an episode is placed on the Joint axis . In other words, the relationship 
between outcome and the partial order is through the Joint direction of the POSAC 
space, which is essentially a refinement of the sum frequency of occurrence of the 
two behaviors that divide the X and Y axis: Distributive–Expressive and Integra-
tive–Instrumental. The sum of these two base coordinates produces a Joint score 
(which ranges from 0 to 200), according to which a final episode of interaction 
scoring over 98.31 is associated with an unsuccessful negotiation. 
Furthermore, because in the current case the partition between successful and 
unsuccessful episodes runs perpendicular to the Joint axis, the rank sum of scores 
across the structs gives the same ranking as the Joint score. This means that the 
sum of scores across the structs of a profile turns out to give an equally good dis -
crimination of negotiation outcome as the Joint score. In the current project, a final 
episode whose sum of scores across the structs is equal to or greater than 8 (12 is 
the highest score according to the present classification) will end in failure, 
regardless of the position of these scores in the profile. In other words, the progno-
sis of outcome relates directly to the degree of competitiveness in interaction and is 
not particularly influenced by the kind of behavior that occurs. 
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Figure 6 
POSAC of 60 Profiles with Labels Denoting the Number of Episodes that 





































Note: Episodes associated with a majority of unsuccessful negotiations are underlined.  
The solid and broken lines differentiate episodes associated with successful and 
unsuccessful negotiations at two different levels of strictness. 
The idea that movement along the scale denotes changes in the probability of 
success may be illustrated by imposing a second partition on the Joint axis to the 
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a high probability of ending unsuccessfully. For instance, the broken line overlaid 
in Figure 6 produces a region containing 54 (59%) of the interactions relating to 
unsuccessful negotiations while only incorrectly partitioning 23 (24%) of the suc-
cess-related interactions. This leaves only 41% of unsuccess ful episodes, but over 
76% of successful episodes in the broad lower region. More generally, the prob-
ability of encompassing episodes related to successful negotiations within a region 
increases with perpendicular movement down the Joint axis. This can be shown by 
calculating odds ratios for the various thresholds along the scale. For example, epi-
sodes falling above the solid line are 2.62 times more likely to be associated with 
unsuccessful rather than successful negotiations. In contrast, episodes falling 
between the solid line and the broken line are 2.00 times more likely to be unsuc-
cessful, while episodes falling below the broken line are 1.95 times more likely to 
end in success. 
Longitudinal Trend along the Distributive Partial-Order 
The possibility of a refined discrimination illustrates the potential for identi-
fying the hypothesized long-term trends in negotiators’ behavior across the epi-
sodes. In order to examine movement along the scale as a negotiation unfolds, the 
Joint score of episodes from each case were analyzed as a function of time. The 
development was modeled by fitting successive trend lines (polytonic curves) until 
reaching an acceptable approximation of the change in the degree of competitive-
ness over the negotiation. Although the number of curve intervals required to ade-
quately capture the developments over time is of interest, a test of the hypotheses is 
given by the slope of the final interval of the fitted curve. A positive or negative 
trend in the Joint score at this stage denotes increasing competitive or cooperative 
behavior respectively, and so allows a test of whether this global aspect of behavior 
can differentiate outcome (Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b). 
For each case, Table 3 gives the coefficient of weak polytonicity (? , Gutt-
man, 1986) for the best fitting model of change in Joint score. The polytonicity 
coefficient indicates the extent to which change in a sequence of numbers (e.g., 
Joint scores) has an upward or downward trend that corresponds with the model 
under consideration. The polytonicity coefficient is actually a generalization of the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient that considers only inequalities across scores and 
is not restricted to considering linear (quantitatively equivalent) changes over time. 
The coefficient, therefore, considers the extent to which data have increasing and 
decreasing trends or “tones” over time, where the number of tones denotes the 
number of allowed changes in direction. For example, a monotone trend measures 
the extent to which the Joint score increases (or decreases) over time, while a due-
tone trend has two intervals, and so measures the extent changes follow a “U” (? ? ) 
or “inverted U” (?? ) pattern over time. The polytonicity coefficient ranges from –
1.00 to 1.00, where unity represents a perfect fit between the data and the consid-
ered model, and the sign of the coefficient indicates whether the initial trend is 
positive or negative. This more general notion of trend aligns itself nicely with the 
hypothesized changes in competitiveness over time (Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 
3b) without imposing the extrinsic, unnecessary assumption that change from epi-
sode to episode is constant. 
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Selection of the best fitting polytonic model proceeded hierarchically with 
terms added until ?  failed to increase by .05 (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The linear 
correlation statistic (R2) and standardized regression coefficients (ß) are also 
reported in Table 3 as an estimate of the extent changes in Joint score are predict-
able from the model. Because R2 makes the unnecessary assumption of linearity 
among scores, the coefficients reported represent a conservative lower-bounds 
estimate of the amount of variance accounted for by the model. The standardized 
regression coefficients continue to give a meaningful index of the average rate of 
change in the Joint score for each interval of the curve. So, for example, Case A 
was most appropriately modeled by a duetone curve that initially decreased in 
competitiveness but then increased in competitiveness (? = –.41). The Joint score 
showed very little change across the episodes (ß [first tone] = –.75 and ß [second 
tone] = .90) such that the model was only able to account for approximately 6% of 
the variance over time. 
Table 3 
Curve Estimation of POSAC Joint Scores on Episodes over Time for 
Nine Crisis Negotiations as a Function of Success 
Outcome Crisis 
Negotiation 
Dir. Model ?  R2 ß 
   Case A ?? 1 Duetone –.411 .062 –.75/ .902 
   Case B ?? ?  Tritone –.885 .328 –.4.46/10.5/–5.79 
   Case C ? ?  Duetone –.342 .045 –.92/.84 
   Case D ? ?  Duetone –.621 .099 –1.13/.94 
Unsuccessful 
   Case E ?? ?  Tritone 1.00 .700 11.4/–27.2/16.4 
   Case F ? ?  Duetone .800 .213 2.00/–1.95 
   Case G ? ?  Duetone .655 .163 1.25/–.94 
   Case H ?? ?  Tritone –.733 .179 –1.05/1.87/–1.28 
Successful 
   Case I ?? ?  Tritone .468 .169 2.28/–6.58/4.12 
1 Direction of best fit curve:  
? = increasing Joint score (increasing competitiveness) 
?  = decreasing Joint score (increasing cooperation) 
2 Beta values are reported for each interval of the model curve. 
An inspection of the top half of Table 3 revealed that 4 of the 5 unsuccessful 
negotiations were most effectively modeled by the predicted final trend of 
increasing competitive behavior. Three cases (Case A, Case C, and Case D) were 
adequately modeled by a duetone trend, which initially showed good progress but 
became increasingly distributive during later stages of interactions. The predicted 
upward movement is also evident in Case E, which is adequately modeled by a 
tritone curve where the final interval involved rapidly increasing competitive 
behavior. An exception was the developing sequence of interactions in Case B, 
which yielded a tritone curve whose final interval was a shallow slope of decreas-
ing competitive behavior, thereby contradicting the hypothesized direction of 
increasing competitiveness. 
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The lower half of Table 3 shows that all but one of the successful incidents 
were best modeled by an overall decrease in competitiveness (Joint score). Specifi-
cally, the analysis indicated that a duetone curve provided a good approximation of 
development in Case F and Case G, while Case H required a more comple x tritone 
model that concluded with decreasing competition. In contrast, Case I did not fit 
the hypothesized pattern of development and was characterized by increasing com-
petitive behavior during the final episodes of interaction. 
An examination of the linear regression data for each incident provides a 
further test of the third set of hypotheses because it gives an indication of how well 
the simple trend models account for actual variation in behavior over time. The 
regression models accounted for approxi mately 25% of change in Joint score for 
unsuccessful incidents (Mean R2 = .25) and at least 18% of development in 
successful negotiations (Mean R2 = .18). These statistics are impressive since they 
suggest that more than one fifth of change in negotiators’ behavior may be 
accounted for by trends along a partially ordered scale of competitiveness. This 
significance is particularly true given the conservative assumptions adopted in 
calculating the R2 statistic and the tremendous number of environmental 
contingencies that are likely to affect negotiators’ behavior. 
Discussion 
One major goal of negotiation research has been to derive a model of com-
munication behavior that may be used to inform inferences about the progress and 
probable outcome of interactions (Abbott, 1986; Sarna, 1997). The current 
approach differs from previous attempts to model the relationship between behav-
iors and outcomes in several important ways. One distinction is that differences 
among interactions are conceptualized as points along a competitive scale where 
they were associated with varying probabilities of success rather than simply 
dichotomized as success or non-success related. Examining interactions in relation 
to a measurement scale allowed POSAC to demonstrate that every episode could 
be summarized by a single score whose relative value corresponded to the prob-
ability of negotiation success. A second difference is the focus on understanding 
the way in which interrelationships among the different degrees and types of com-
municat ion behavior structure the competitive scale. This moves beyond examin-
ing the relationships between single behaviors and outcomes, and towards explic -
itly tracking how negotiators use constellations of behaviors to pursue their com-
plex and often contradictory goals. A third methodological distinction is the pro-
ject’s focus on determining how well similarities and differences in communication 
behavior enable accurate discrimination of negotiation outcome. This is in contrast 
to “partitioning of variance” (e.g., ANOVA) which can tell very little about effi-
cacy of discriminating outcome, and is often misunderstood in this regard. 
The project showed that differences in communication behavior across 189 
interaction episodes may be adequately modeled using a two-dimensional space 
defined by a partially ordered scale of increasing competitiveness. Furthermore, a 
threshold on this competitive dimension was shown to provide an optimal dis -
crimination of outcome, with episodes associated with unsuccessful negotiations 
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falling, on average, at higher points on the scale than episodes related to successful 
incidents. These findings provide empirical justification for viewing hostage nego-
tiations as “crisis bargaining” (Donohue et al., 1991), in which progress may be 
judged by the extent a competitive crisis response is supplanted by a more coop-
erative problem-solving approach to interactions. However, while a one-dimen-
sional competitive scale, backed by theory, illustrates that very simple patterns 
underlie what is traditionally viewed as a complex process, the true importance of 
showing that negotiation can be modeled in this way lies elsewhere. If a scale is 
consistently found over replications with different samples of variables (and across 
different transcripts), then it might be inferred, by way of generalization, that the 
negotiation process itself is scalable. In other words, it may be possible to identify 
patterns in communication that are independent of the behaviors or coding scheme 
examined, thereby identifying regularities that form the basis of a general theory of 
the negotiation process. Revealing regularities in communication that transcend the 
variety of possible coding schemes is likely to be particularly important to cumula-
tive progress in communication research. 
In order to understand the dynamics that cause different levels of competition 
among episodes, the current paper identified the roles each behavior played in 
structuring the two -dimensional space. Of particular importance in defining this 
prognostic scale were the behavioral groups Distributive–Expressive and Integra-
tive–Instrumental, which adopted orthogonal (base) roles in structuring the repre-
sentative axes of the POSAC space. The content of these base items show empiri-
cally what practitioners have long observed, namely, that negotiation success is 
dependent on the reduction of mistrust and psychological distance between parties 
and the development of a cooperative problem-solving environment. In other 
words, a failure to either generate interest in substantive problem solving or control 
the level of expressive hostility in dialogue is the principle reason negotiations 
move beyond the threshold and towards inevitable failure. The POSAC analysis 
therefore moves beyond many previous results to identify two qualitatively differ-
ent types of risk behavior; an extreme level of one of these types or a high level of 
both types was found suggestive of future negotiation failure. Thus, occurrence of 
an episode that involves behavior located by the prognosis items as above the dis -
criminant level may be used to alert negotiators to possible impending trouble. A 
preponderance of interactions above this level should prompt the decision-maker to 
consider resorting to tactical intervention. This final decision should take into 
account a number of other external factors (e.g., type of hostage taker, number of 
hostages), since such factors may influence the extent to which interactions orien-
tate around changes in the base dimensions of Distributive–Expressive and Inte-
grative–Instrumental behavior. 
However, interestingly, the fact that the interrelationships among the commu -
nication behaviors could be well-represented in a two -dimensional space means 
that discrimination of any such outside factor (e.g., types  of hostage taker) from 
these behaviors should be at most two -dimensional. For example, a researcher pre-
dicting that negotiators’ gender leads to difference in communication behavior 
would need to show that episodes involving male negotiators and episodes  involv-
ing female negotiators fall into distinct regions of the current POSAC space. If no 
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systematic pattern emerges, then the difference, if any, between male and female 
negotiators is focused on a “third dimension” of the negotiation process that is not 
encapsulated in the variables studied in the current POSAC. Thus, the question of 
whether two dimensions are a sufficient representation of the structure of commu -
nication is an important avenue of replication in future research. Studies may build 
on the current framework by exploring additional facets of behavior to determine 
whether they refine the current interrelations or require an additional independent 
dimension for representation. Also interesting in this regard would be to determine 
whether comparable structures in communication behavior emerge from dialogue 
in other dyadic and group interactions. Such direct comparisons are possible using 
POSAC because hypothesis testing is based on the intrinsic structure of the data 
and does not arise from omitting components or imposing an extrinsic statistical 
framework. 
The conceptualization of behavior along a partially ordered competitive scale 
enabled analysis to simultaneously show that successful and unsuccessful negotia-
tions may be differentiated in terms of long-term developmental trends in behavior. 
Specifically, findings indicated that unsuccessful negotiations are characterized by 
the occurrence of a final trend of increasing competitive behavior across interac-
tions, whereas incidents associated with successful negotiation showed a gradual 
decrease in competitive behavior. These trends show that larger, more progressive 
patterns of relational development can emerge from the dynamic local exploration 
of individuals’ concerns (Gulliver, 1979). Indeed, because it was possible to 
simultaneously examine global trends and local dynamics of behavior, the findings 
lend credence to Donohue and Roberto’s (1996) suggestion that the dominant 
process accounts of negotiation are not competing models but rather frameworks 
which capture interaction dynamics at different levels of analysis. In the current 
negotiations, progression over time was satisfactorily represented by several (at 
most three) long-term trends in behavior, which is a pattern that closely resembles 
the Stage account (Putnam, 1990). Yet, the distribution of interaction in the 
POSAC space is dependent on the juxtaposition of Distributive and Integrative 
behaviors along the two base axes, implying that the Interdependence account is 
central to any conceptualization of local level dynamics. In the current framework, 
this interdependence is structured in the form of a single dimension (i.e., the Lat-
eral axis), but further work is required to define the exact content underlying this 
dimension. 
Indeed, one useful feature of POSAC is the ability to examine sequences of 
behavior by connecting episodes from a single case in temporal order, whereby 
changes in behavior are shown as movement across the regions of the solution 
space. A more detailed examination of this kind may provide insights into the rela-
tionship between broad trends and local interdependence in generating negotiation 
outcome. However, what it cannot do is give information about the actual topic of 
interaction, which would require a more in-depth qualitative analysis of the tran-
scripts. Future work of this kind would do well to focus on the dynamics that cause 
a transition in development between increasing Integrative behavior and increasing 
Distributive behavior. 
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Conclusions 
Overall, the results of this study provide empirical evidence of the usefulness 
of POSAC for examining the intrinsic structure of differences among episodes of 
communication and for classifying negotiation success relative to basic behavioral 
components of interaction. The analysis demonstrated the usefulness of conceptu-
alizing behavior as having various roles on a single scale of competitiveness, along 
which the evolving sequences of interactions can be mapped. These findings not 
only support the relationships proposed by previous studies, but also emphasize the 
need for future work to clearly specify the interrelationships among the behavioral 
predictors under investigation. 
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